1.1.44 naveti vibhāşā
This is a deceptively short and seemingly
straightforward sutra, and Vasu (Vol.I) deals with it in a brief half page. The
words are as follows.
na (not) vā (or) iti (thus) vibhāşā
(vibhāşā)
The explanation or vŗrtti is as follows.
Na iti (saying thus: not) pratişedho
(alternative?) vā iti (saying thus: or) vikalpah (suggestion?) tayoh (of the
two) pratişedha-vikalpayoh (of the alternative-suggestion? pair) vibhāşā iti (thus, vibhāşā) samjñā (technical
term) bhavati (is)
In plain terms,
The term vibhāşā (option) refers to the
pair of “may or may not”.
Thus, where there is a certain prohibition
and then an alternative option, there is a vibhāşā. The option may be given
where there is a given initial rule, and then an option is given (prāpta- vibhāşā,
the word prāpta meaning attained, obtained); the second type is where there is
no initial condition or negation, but an option is given (aprāpta- vibhāşā);
and a third type is where both situations co-exist (prāptāprāpta - vibhāşā ,
note the sandhi joining).
Sharma, however gives this sutra as many as
4 pages of dense prose, amounting more or less to the same thing, except that
he gives illustrations (from the commentaries) of different types, which are
rather involved and will be probably incomprehensible to us until we have gone
through the concerned rules and sutras (scattered through different chapters). We
did come across an example earlier
1.1.32 vibhāşā jasi, to which we have to
add, by carry-forward
Dvandve (#31) na (#29) sarvādīini
sarvanāmāni (#27)
That is, sarva- list words are usually
sarvanāmāni, but not in dvandva (binary) compounds; however, there is an
alternative option in the Jas case, i.e. nominative plural (see Vibhakti page).
The option is expressed as two forms of the declined compound noun, depending
on whether we treat it like a sarvanāman or not (na va!). This would be a
prāpta- vibhāşā, as there is a rule to start with to which an option is given.
This is a good example to explore how the
commentators of yore attack the matter, such as the explanations in Patañjali’s
great commentary (mahābhāşya), as interpreted in p.236 to p.270 of Subrahmanya
Shastri’s lectures (Vol.2, downloadable from archives.org, see the Resources
page). If you thought Sharma was prolix, Patanjali is verbose, dealing with
this one sutra in the sixth “āhnika” or day’s lecture. In these 36 pages,
Patanjali explores all possible variations and aspects of the sutra. Sharma has
exposed a summary in his four pages, which themselves soon become opaque to our
understanding, therefore as beginners we cannot really hope to follow Patanjali
in all the twists and turns of his arguments, but we can try and understand
broadly how he approaches the question of reading, and understanding, Panini.
Briefly, then, let me try and expose the contents of Patanjali’s sixth āhnika
on vibhāşā.
The first part of the commentary is
concerned with how we parse the words in the sutra. Patanjali first states that
we should understand the form naveti as its meaning, and not just as the word
as it is sounded. It is the meaning of naveti that gets the appellation or samjñā
name of vibhāşā. This distinction is somewhat academic, because some sutras
define just the sound or śabda as a certain entity, whereas in this sutra we
are to understand the meaning, or artha, as the target of the definition of vibhāşā.
Examples of sutras where only the sound is taken include dādhāghvadāp (1.1.20),
taraptamapau ghah (1.1.22), which as we mentioned in passing, define the
entities ghu and gha merely by the existence of certain sound groups like dā,
dhā, tara, tama, etc. There is no meaning attached to these sounds (apart from
their grammatical significance, of course). On the other hand, in the present
sutra, it is not that vibhāşā occurs wherever the sound group naveti occurs, but
we have to take the meaning, and not just the sounds, of naveti to understand vibhāşā. One justification for taking the meaning as
the objective is that it fits in wherever the term vibhāşā is used; or, as the
commentator puts it, if the samjñā were to retricted to the śabda (sound), it
cannot reach the artha as elsewhere (and, by implication, we may add that it
would not make sense in the different contexts in which the term is used). The
use of the word iti (thus said) also denotes that we are considering the
meaning of the word group navā, rather than just the sounds. The discussant
questions this kutah? (how) and gets the terse reply lokatah (from the world),
i.e. from common usage.
Thus much for the preliminary sparring. Now
let us come to the interpretation of the meaning. There is an extended
discussion on why we should not interpret navā in the sense of new (feminine),
as in navā kuņd̨ikā or navā ghaţikā (Shastri,
vol.2, p.239). So we rule out any suggestion that navā vibhāşā means ‘newness
is termed vibhāşā’. The na is a vidhi, condition, preceding the vā, and can
mean only pratişedha (opposition?), yathā loke (as in this world) (p.240). The
listener chides the speaker for giving an example with a non-feminine word following navā, which
sort of begs the question, as we would say, and he asks him to provide an
example with a feminine noun following navā: “The humour in the method of
presentation is to be noted”, says Shastri, apparently a man easily amused.
The commentary goes on to explain how na
introduces nişedha (prohibition), and vā removes it by pratişedha (counter-option?
alternative?), so that there is no conflict (vipratişedha). Here the concepts
of prāpta (obtained) and aprāpta (not obtained) are introduced. The option
(vibhāşā) may be available aprāpte (to “one which has not been enjoined”, p.243),
or prāpte (to one which has already been enjoined, p.244). That is, the option
is available either without any preceding statement of prohibition (aprāpte),
or after such a prohibition (prāpte). The discussant demurs: vidhi-pratişedhayor-yuga-pad-vacanam
nopapadyate (remember Krishna admonishing
Arjuna that his cowardice does not behove him, na upapadyate) (“the
inappropriateness of the mention of vidhi condition and pratişedha counter? at
the same time). The commentator reiterates that when the option pratişedha
comes into operation, the vidhi prohibition cannot be accomplished. Pūrva-vidhim-uttaro-vidhir-badhyate
(the preceding rule is set at naught by the following rule, p.245).
The discussion meanders on somewhat after
this. At one point, the commentator is reduced to arguing that viditatvāt –
yadanena yogena prārthyate tasyārthasya viditatvāt (“since it is known – the
object which is sought by this sutra is already known”, p.250). Further, “Acharya
Panini... expresses the same idea through other expressions like bahulam,
anyatarasyām, ubhayathā, vā, ekeşām” (p.250). There is ambiguity, says the
discussant, whether the vibhāşā is operative prāpte, aprāpte, or ubhayatra (in
both cases), and he points to sutra 1.1.32
1.1.32 (dvandve ca) vibhāşā jasi
(which we
came across before), as such a case (for Patanjali’s explanation, see p.252). A
number of other such cases are exposed and disposed of by the expert. This goes
on, case after case, till p.270 and the end of āhnika 6. The whole discussion, as
already stated, is summarised by Sharma in four pages, and bypassed by Vasu
with just a mention of the three contexts, prāpte, aprāpte and ubhayatra.
